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ArbitrageWe compare the market pricing of euro area government bonds and the corresponding Credit Default
Swaps (CDSs). In particular, we analyse the ‘‘basis” defined as the difference between the premium on
the CDS and the credit spread on the underlying bond. Our sample of weekly data covers the period from
January 2007 to December 2012 and contains several episodes of sovereign market distress. Overall, we
observe a complex relationship between the derivatives market and the underlying cash market charac-
terised by sizable deviations from the no-arbitrage relationship (i.e. basis equal to zero). We show that
short-selling frictions explain the persistence of positive basis deviations while funding frictions explain
the persistence of negative basis deviations which are observed for countries with weak public finances.
Moreover, we show that the ‘‘flight-to-quality/liquidity” phenomenon in bond markets is a key driver of
the large positive basis of better rated countries.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction onward. This period of stress significantly affected the market pric-Sovereign debt markets in a number of euro area countries
came under unprecedented stress from the first half of 2010ing of government debt. Before the global financial crisis, valuation
of debt issued by developed country governments had typically
treated a default as a very low probability event. In fact, empirical
modelling (e.g. in term structure analysis) was mainly oriented
towards interest rate risk or liquidity risk, rather than default risk.
The lack of defaults among developed country governments under-
pinned the widely used assumption that government bonds
provide a good proxy for the long-horizon (default-) risk-free rate;
a core feature of asset pricing.3
The purpose of our paper is to study the relative pricing of
sovereign credit risk in the euro area. In particular, we compare
the market pricing of euro area sovereign CDS and the correspond-
ing bonds issued by the same government. This CDS-bond ‘‘basis”share of
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government bond of similar maturity over a risk-free benchmark.
Sovereign CDS and the underlying government bonds offer inves-
tors a similar exposure to the risk and return of sovereign debt
and therefore their relative pricing is linked by a no-arbitrage rela-
tion.4 Deviations from parity can provide information on the exis-
tence and size of arbitrage opportunities which should typically be
very small or disappear quickly if credit markets are functioning nor-
mally. We document that, since the onset of the US subprime crisis
and even more so during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, all euro
area countries’ CDS-bond bases deviated from zero persistently and
exhibited strong co-movement. A Principal Component Analysis
reveals that the 1st PC and 2nd PCs explain respectively 45% and
13% the total variation of the basis. Further analysis of the loadings
suggests that the 1st PC captures the co-movement, while the 2nd
PC differentiates between ‘‘core” (AT, BE, DE, FR and NL) and ‘‘periph-
eral” (GR, IE, IT, PT and SP) countries. In fact, while the basis for
‘‘core” countries was persistently positive the basis for ‘‘peripheral”
countries went negative in several occasions from 2011 on.
A number of authors have already investigated the relation
between CDS premia and bond spreads. In the non-crisis period
of 2002/03, Blanco et al. (2005) show that the theoretical arbitrage
relationship linking corporate credit spreads to CDS holds reason-
ably well on average, but also that the repo cost of short-selling the
cash bond affects the positive basis and that short-lived deviations
are due to a lead for CDS prices over bond spreads in the price dis-
covery process. Ammer and Cai (2011) point out that the ‘‘cheap
est-to-delivery” option explains the positive basis observed for
sovereign emerging markets in the period 2001/05.5 Recent work
has documented large and persistent negative basis deviations in
the corporate sector during the US subprime crisis and in particular
after the Lehmann collapse in 2008. As discussed by Duffie (2010)
special capital impediments to capital formation have caused asset
price distortions. Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) argue that due to
funding problems ‘‘securities with nearly identical cash flows (such
as CDS and bond spreads), but different margins, traded at a different
price, giving rise to price gaps (basis)” violating the law of one price.
Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) suggest capital shortages at major deal-
ers as the most plausible explanation of the negative CDS-Bond
basis. Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) point to drivers related to
funding risk, counterparty risk and ‘‘collateral quality”. Fontana
(2012) highlights the role of funding liquidity risk and ‘‘conver
gence-trading” activity in driving the basis negative during the crisis.
We contribute to the empirical literature by highlighting and
explaining basis deviations in the context of the euro are sovereign
crisis. Our first result is that variables, which previous research has
identified as key drivers of credit spreads (cf. Collin-Dufresne et al.,
2001, Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Raunig and Scheicher, 2009;
Ericsson et al. 2009), do not affect CDS premia and bond spreads
during the credit crisis in the same manner. In the credit risk liter-
ature, a commonly used theoretical framework is the structural
model of Merton (1974), which has been extended towards sover-
eign credit risk by Gapen et al. (2008). Our analysis shows that, in
the cross-section, for both CDSs and bond spreads, the signs of the
coefficients of our country-specific covariates, which are signifi-
cant, correspond to our hypotheses. In the time-series perspective,
CDSs correlate with country-specific covariates and with proxies
for risk premium while bond spreads only proxies for risk4 This no-arbitrage relationship is discussed in detail in Section 2, while the
arbitrage strategies are covered in Section 3.
5 CDS contracts that are most widely traded do not apply to a specific debt
instrument. In practice, a variety of senior obligations are eligible for delivery. All else
equal, the CTD option is expected to have a stronger effect on CDS pricing when it is
more likely that a protection buyer will be able to exercise the CTD option, hence the
CDS-bond basis is an increasing function of the probability of default. In our view, it is
unlikely to be the explanation of the positive basis for creditworthy countries.premium. Overall, CDS premia are more sensitive to country speci-
fic drivers of credit risk.6
Our second result is that when the basis is positive (i.e. CDS pre-
mium exceeds bond spread), ‘‘short-selling frictions” play a signif-
icant role. To profit from positive deviations arbitrageurs have to
be able to take short positions without major frictions. We use
the variable ‘‘Active Utilisation” (obtained from Data Markit Explor-
ers) as a proxy for ‘‘short-selling frictions”. ‘‘Active Utilisation” is the
share (%) of securities in lending programs which are currently out
on loan. This information is available to us at the bond-level for all
ten benchmark bonds in our sample. Our assumption is that when
this value is high there is a lack of bonds available to short in the
market. We find that bonds with stronger ‘‘short-selling frictions”
tend to have larger positive bases, that the basis dynamics corre-
lates significantly with ‘‘short-selling frictions” and that pricing
deviations lag the emergence of these frictions.
Two additional results on positive basis deviations are worth
noting. First, throughout the sample, ‘‘core” countries have larger
positive bases. Because of the ‘‘flight-to-quality” bond trading
activity has shifted from ‘‘peripheral” countries to ‘‘core” countries,
especially to the German bund driving its yield to a historically
unprecedented low. As higher bond liquidity reduces the bond
yield spread, it should also be reflected in a larger CDS-bond basis.
Against this background, we show that bonds characterized by
lower (higher) credit risk, which tend to have larger (smaller) pos-
itive bases, are also more (less) liquid. We also show that these
more liquid (and creditworthy) bonds are characterized by stron-
ger ‘‘short-selling frictions”. Our interpretation of this finding is
that the ‘‘flight-to-quality/liquidity” effect is a key determinant of
the positive basis and that bond liquidity and short-selling frictions
together drive the positive basis. Second, the ECB’s SMP purchases
have a positive impact on the basis. To address shrinking liquidity
in some euro area government bond markets and contribute to
restoring an appropriate monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism, in May 210 the ECB introduced the Securities Markets Pro-
gramme (SMP), which stopped purchases in September 2012. We
find that SMP purchases during May 2010 and August 2011 were
associated with increasing bond spreads. The SMP has been active
to the largest extent when credit spreads were increasing sharply
and the bond markets were extremely illiquid. Since, in May
2010 and August 2011, its impact on the basis is positive, our inter-
pretation is that the buying pressure generated by the SMP was
reflected in relatively stable (but still increasing) bond yields and
in a temporary improvement of bond liquidity, as measured e.g.
by bid-ask spreads. Positive deviations persisted because the ECB
is a ‘‘big buy – and – hold investor” (Corradin and Maddaloni
(2015)) and, with the SMP, it has affected ‘‘short-selling frictions”,
as captured both by bond specialness (a pricing measure of the cost
of short selling) and, on the quantity side, by the lack of bonds to
short-sell.7
Our third result is that for two countries with weaker public
finances (Italy and Spain), we observe the significant role of sharp
increases in haircuts applied on government bonds in repo transac-
tion and corresponding negative basis deviations also linked to the
deterioration of bond liquidity. This supports the view that ‘‘fund-
ing frictions” made it difficult for arbitrageurs to finance the pur-
chase of credit risky bonds (via repo) for profiting from ‘‘negative
basis trades” (in line with the argument of Duffie (2010)).
Overall, our results indicate that more creditworthy bonds exhi-
bit larger positive bases, due to a liquidity price premium, which6 In the paper, we report results for weekly data. These results are confirmed also
for daily and bi-weekly data.
7 Corradin and Maddaloni (2015) show that the cost of shorting Italian government
bonds via reverse-repo (i.e. ‘‘specialness”), is linked to ‘‘short-selling pressures” and
that ECB outright purchases have exacerbated the repo market squeeze.
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tions”. In contrast, riskier bonds in terms of perceived default risk
are often characterized by negative bases, due to an illiquidity yield
premium, which is difficult to arbitrage away because of ‘‘funding
frictions”.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
some background on sovereign CDS. Section 3 develops the main
hypotheses we test. Section 4 describes the data we use and discusses
some preliminary result on the behaviour of the basis. Section 5 pre-
sents the results of the econometric analysis. Section 6 concludes.2. Background on sovereign CDSs
A CDS contract transfers the risk that a certain individual entity
defaults from the ‘‘protection buyer” to the ‘‘protection seller” in
exchange for the payment of a regular fee. In case of a ‘‘credit
event” such as a default, the buyer is fully compensated by receiv-
ing the difference between the notional amount of the loan (made
to the defaulted entity) and its recovery value from the protection
seller.8 The CDS premium, typically expressed in basis points per
annum as a fraction of the underlying notional is the cost for protec-
tion against default. As in the case of an interest rate swap the
premium is set such that the CDS transaction has a value of zero at
the time of origination.9 In a standard CDS contract two parties enter
into an agreement terminating either at the stated maturity or earlier
when a previously specified credit event occurs and the protection
component is triggered. Three important credit events defined by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association are: (1) Failure
to pay principal or coupon when they are due. Hence, already the
failure to pay a coupon can represent a credit event, albeit most likely
one with a high recovery (i.e. ‘‘technical default”). (2) Restructuring:
The range of admissible events depends on the currency and the
precise terms which materialise. (3) Repudiation/moratorium.
For corporate as well as sovereign CDSs, the premium can be
interpreted as a credit spread on a bond issued by the underlying
name. Based on a no-arbitrage argument (Duffie, 1999) the CDS
premium should be equal to the yield spread over a risk-free
benchmark on a par floating-rate bond. According to this pricing
analysis, the risk-reward profile of a protection seller, who is
‘‘long” credit risk, is equivalent to a trading strategy which combi-
nes a bond, by the same name, with a short position in a default-
risk-free bond. While a protection buyer’s exposure is equivalent
to a strategy which combines a long default risk-free bond and a
short position on the defaultable bond. Based on this theoretical
equivalence, traders try to arbitrage price differences between a
defaultable bond, a risk-free bond and the CDS. Sovereign CDSs,
compared to CDSs on corporations, can be used for two additional
purposes. First, investors can hedge macro risk of portfolios
composed of loans to corporations in foreign emerging countries.
Second, investors can hedge counterparty risk in interest-rate
derivative transactions in the case of bank exposure to governmen-
tal bodies (e.g. debt management offices), as many of these public-
sector entities do not provide collateral.
Even if CDSs are a better proxy for market pricing of credit risk
than bonds a number of additional factors may influence CDS8 After a credit event the protection seller compensates the protection buyer for the
incurred loss by either paying the face value of the bond in exchange for the defaulted
bond (physical settlement) or by paying the difference between the post-default
market value of the bond and the par value (cash settlement). The post-default value
of the bond is fixed by an auction procedure. In the context of sovereign risk, the first
such auction procedure was held for Ecuador in January 2009.
9 Since May 2009, CDS trading has undergone a ‘‘big bang” with prices now
consisting of an upfront payment and a regular premium fixed at either 100 bps or
500 bps (depending on credit quality). Combining the two components leads to the
CDS premium which is comparable to the previous contracts. http://www.markit.-
com/cds/announcements/resource/cds-big-bang.pdf.spreads. First, CDSs on euro area governments can be denominated
both in Euro and in USD. In the case of a credit event, a severe
depreciation of the bond’s currency is likely. As euro area countries
CDSs denominated in USD provide a hedge to ‘‘depreciation risk”
they tend to be traded with a premium with respect to those
quoted in Euro. Second, CDS contracts have several restructuring
clauses which affect their pricing. Cumulative Restructuring (CR)
is the most common for European sovereigns. This clause includes
‘‘restructuring” as a default event and allows the protection buyer
to deliver bonds of any maturity after restructuring of debt.10 Third,
as the value of protection depends on sellers’ creditworthiness, an
additional element which affects the pricing of CDSs is counterparty
risk. CDSs on major countries may not always provide genuinely
robust insurance against a large-scale default given the close link-
ages between sovereigns and the financial sector. As discussed by
Arora et al. (2012) market participants typically collateralize these
transactions, hence counterparty risk is expected to be negligible.11
3. The relation between CDSs and bonds and the main
hypotheses
In order to investigate the behavior of the basis during the euro
are sovereign crisis we formulate five hypotheses.
As discussed in Section 2, CDSs and bonds offer investors a sim-
ilar exposure to the risk and return of debt issued by governments,
hence, their pricing is expected to be determined by the same set of
factors. Whether the crisis has affected the pricing of sovereign
credit risk differently across the derivatives and the cash market
is ultimately an empirical question.
Hypothesis 1. During the crisis, the key drivers of sovereign credit
risk have had different effects on CDS premia and bond spreads.
The CDS-bond basis should be approximately zero due to the
no-arbitrage principle. To exploit a negative basis an arbitrageur
has to finance the purchase of the underlying bond, via a repo
transaction, and buy protection (CDS), so that a bond’s default risk
is fully hedged. To exploit a positive basis an arbitrageur has to
short-sell, via a reverse-repo transaction, the underlying bond
and sell protection. In a basis trade the investor ‘‘locks-in” an annu-
ity which stops at the maturity of the bond or at default, whichever
comes first. Deviations of the basis from zero provide information
on the existence and size of arbitrage opportunities which should
typically be very small and disappear quickly if credit markets
were functioning normally. We explore the idea that basis devia-
tions are generated by the presence of ‘‘frictions” which impair
arbitrage activity across the derivative and cash market.
Hypothesis 2. ‘‘Short-selling frictions” explain persistent positive
basis deviations.
‘‘Short-selling frictions” represent the difficulty for market par-
ticipants to short-sell bonds. These bonds are often not available or
the rates at which these can be obtained in reverse-repo transac-
tions are lower than the rates on other types of collateral (i.e. the10 CR was the standard contract term in the 1999 ISDA definition. The modified-
restructuring (MR) clause, which has become common practice in US from 2001 on,
limits deliverable obligations to bonds with a maturity of 30 months or less after a
restructuring. The modified- modified-restructuring (MM) clause has been introduced
in 2003. Under this rule, which is more common for corporations in Europe,
deliverable obligations can be maturing in up to 60 months after a restructuring. The
no-restructuring (XR) clause excludes all restructuring events under the CDS contract
as ‘‘trigger events”.
11 Sellers of protection are exposed to counterparty risk too since they face ‘‘mark-
to-market” losses in the event of the failure of the protection buyer. Therefore,
counterparty risk is ‘‘two-sided” and it is non-trivial to assess its pricing impact on the
CDS premium.
Fig. 1. The CDS Premium and the Bond Yield Spread – France. This figure shows the
time-series of the CDS premium and the bond yield spread for France. The CDS
premium, the national benchmark bond and the risk-free benchmark (i.e. the
German bund), used to calculate the bond spread, have a 10-year maturity. The
sample period is January 2007 to December 2012. Observations are in basis points
and are at a weekly frequency.
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rate is an opportunity cost. A positive basis then persists because
‘‘short-selling frictions” prevent arbitrageurs to short-sell the bond
(in a ‘‘positive basis trade”) in order to profit from the relative
mispricing.
Hypothesis 3. More creditworthy countries with more liquid
government bonds (i.e. driven by ‘‘Flight-to-quality”) have larger
CDS-bond bases.
With the ‘‘Flight-to-quality” bond trading activity has shifted
from ‘‘peripheral” countries to ‘‘core” countries, especially to
German bunds, driving their yield to historically very low levels.
We expect bond liquidity to be reflected in a price premium, hence
in a relatively lower bond yield spread and a larger CDS-bond basis.
Hypothesis 4. ECB bond purchases have a positive impact on the
basis.
The ECB’s SMP, which targeted bonds of ‘‘peripheral” countries,
was aimed at lowering the illiquidity yield premium required by
investors due to the absence of trading activity in situations of high
credit risk. The SMP’s sizable purchases should increase bond
prices and are expected to temporarily increase the basis. As
described by Corradin and Maddaloni (2015) the SMP portfolio is
oriented towards the long term and the bonds are not repo-ed
out again. Therefore, the ECB activity is also likely to have exacer-
bated ‘‘short-selling frictions”, further fostering the persistence of a
positive basis.
Hypothesis 5. ‘‘Funding frictions” explain persistent negative basis
deviations.
‘‘Funding frictions” represent the high cost to fund the purchase
of bonds. Difficulties in access to sufficient funding (e.g. lending
from prime brokers) are due to the presence of ‘‘haircuts” (i.e. mar-
gins) in repo transactions which fund bond purchases. Analogously
to the positive basis and ‘‘short-selling frictions”, a negative basis
persists because ‘‘funding frictions” make it difficult for arbi-
trageurs to finance the purchase of the bond (via repo transaction)
for implementing a ‘‘negative basis trade”.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
4.1. CDS premia and bond spreads
Our sample comprises the following ten euro area countries:
Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece
(GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) and
Spain (SP) and covers the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 Decem-
ber 2012.12 We obtain ten-year benchmark bond yields from Datas-
tream and CDS premia with a ten year maturity from Markit.13 Fig. 1
shows the time-series of the CDS premium and the bond spread for
one selected country (France).
During our sample period, credit spreads increased and reached
their maximum level between September 2011 and August 2012.
Notice that, in the case of France, the CDS premium was substan-
tially larger than the bond spread (as discussed in the next
paragraph). Table 1, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of12 We censor the series for Greece in June 2012 as credit spreads reached very high
levels and trading activities reduced dramatically. For Germany the bond yield spread
over the bund is by definition zero.
13 In our empirical analysis, daily data are transformed into weekly, taking the last
observation of the week. We focus both on CDS quoted in Euro and in USD, the former
are available only for a subsample period and the latter are more liquid, as discussed
in Section 2. We select the Cumulative Restructuring (CR) clause as this is most
common for European sovereign CDS.CDS premia and bond yield spreads (calculated over the German
Bund) weekly changes for the ten sample countries.
‘‘Peripheral” (GR, IE, IT, PT and SP) countries’ spreads increased
more and exhibited a larger variability. Throughout the sample, the
average CDS change (standard deviation), expressed in basis
points, was 0.45 (9.74) for ‘‘core” countries (AT, BE, FR, DE, NL)
and 2.27 (35.72) for ‘‘peripheral” countries. Similarly, the bond
spread average change (standard deviation), was 0.16 (8.37) for
‘‘core” countries and 0.97 (39.5) for ‘‘peripheral” countries. The
average correlation, across countries, between CDS and bond
spreads changes respectively was 0.60 and 0.67, hence significantly
different from one as would be expected in the case of a ‘‘perfect”
no-arbitrage relation. We proceed by analysing the degree of co-
movements of credit spreads across countries by means of a prin-
cipal component analysis. In Table 2, Panel A, the first and second
columns list the percentage of explained variation by the first three
components.
In the case of CDS premia, the 1st PC explains 64%, the 2nd PC
12%, and the first three PCs together explain 84% of the total vari-
ation. As shown in Panel B, the 1st PC places similar weights
(eigenvectors), across all countries and the average weight within
the two groups of ‘‘core” and ‘‘peripheral” countries is 0.34 vs.
0.30. Therefore, the 1st PC can be defined as a ‘‘level factor”, in
the sense that when this factor increases, CDS premia across coun-
tries all increase. For the 2nd PC the average weights within the
two different groups of ‘‘core” and ‘‘peripheral” countries are -
0.24 vs. 0.32. As this 2nd component differentiates well across
countries it can be defined as a ‘‘core” vs. ‘‘periphery” factor. This
result is in line with Groba et al. (2013).
In the case of bond spreads, the 1st PC alone explains 50% of the
variation, the 2nd PC the 14%, whereas the first three PCs in total
explain 75%. Note that the economic interpretation of the 1st and
2nd components is identical for CDSs and bonds spreads and that
the degree of co-movement is very similar. To compare these
results with previous studies on sovereign CDSs we consider a
proxy for domestic stock market performance, i.e. the returns on
country-specific equity indexes.14 We find that commonality in
equity returns and CDSs is similar. In the case of the equity indexes,14 Longstaff et al. (2011) focus on a global rather than EU sample and on a time-span
which ends before the onset of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. They find that the
diversification benefits of sovereign credit portfolios (CDS) are lower than for
international equity portfolios.
Table 1
CDS premia, bond spreads, basis and ‘‘adjusted” basis – descriptive statistics. Panel A. reports descriptive statistics for weekly CDS premia and bond yield spread (over the bund
and with 10-year maturity) changes measured in basis points. Panel B. descriptive statistics for weekly CDS-bond basis and ‘‘adjusted” CDS-bond basis changes. The sample period
is January 2007–December 2012.
D(CDS) D(Bond spread) N. Obs: Correlation
Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. D(CDS) vs. D(bond spread)
Panel A
AT 0.41 12.58 71.55 59.75 0.13 8.01 47.70 49.20 326 0.56
BE 0.60 15.69 74.13 119.09 0.23 13.72 78.40 110.30 326 0.82
DE 0.32 5.25 24.41 22.46 // // // // 326 //
FR 0.58 8.86 28.42 53.82 0.21 7.26 35.90 40.10 326 0.60
GR 5.04 46.69 260.31 325.71 0.08 84.71 347.17 1289.90 232 0.20
IE 1.36 38.11 227.37 279.83 1.03 30.92 157.70 191.90 326 0.79
IT 1.40 21.93 86.80 99.00 0.95 18.70 75.90 100.60 326 0.77
NL 0.34 6.32 31.48 34.67 0.05 4.50 18.00 15.10 326 0.41
PT 1.99 50.31 310.15 248.66 1.70 42.22 210.30 173.08 326 0.77
SP 1.53 21.58 71.52 101.49 1.26 21.22 71.30 120.80 326 0.83
Core 0.45 9.74 46.00 57.96 0.16 8.37 45.00 53.68 0.60
Periphery 2.27 35.72 191.23 210.94 0.97 39.55 172.47 375.26 0.67
D(CDS-bond basis) D(Adjusted CDS-bond basis) N. Obs: Correlation
Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. D(Basis) vs. D(Adj basis)
Panel B
AT 0.15 10.05 56.51 55.94 0.06 8.34 32.10 38.44 326 0.85
BE 0.13 8.54 36.38 33.68 0.08 8.23 30.81 30.47 326 0.80
DE 0.20 5.18 24.41 22.46 // // // // 326 //
FR 0.21 7.27 30.72 26.79 0.00 6.12 19.86 29.20 326 0.71
GR 0.03 30.30 117.52 177.32 0.05 29.87 128.02 174.37 232 0.98
IE 0.20 22.81 109.57 97.80 0.40 22.18 99.55 100.41 326 0.97
IT 0.01 14.54 101.86 53.77 0.21 13.05 96.29 46.83 326 0.93
NL 0.16 5.97 26.84 22.25 0.05 5.20 13.85 24.13 326 0.57
PT 0.19 31.43 144.56 198.49 0.39 30.32 152.45 176.03 326 0.98
SP 0.16 12.86 50.03 55.81 0.36 12.09 45.26 51.47 326 0.91
Core 0.17 7.40 34.97 32.22 0.05 6.97 24.16 30.56 0.73
Periphery 0.10 22.39 104.71 116.64 0.26 21.50 104.31 109.82 0.95
Table 2
CDS, bond spread and CDS-bond basis – principal component analysis. This table reports results of a principal component analysis of weekly changes of CDS premia, bond spreads
and national equity index returns, CDS-bond bases and ‘‘adjusted” CDS-bond bases changes. Panel A. reports the percentage of explained variation by 1st, 2nd and 3rd PC and the
cumulative percentage of explained variation by the first three PCs. Panel B. reports the eigenvectors (loadings) of PC1 and PC2 across the various countries. At the bottom of the
averages of the loadings within the two groups of ‘‘core” and ‘‘peripheral” countries are reported. The sample period is January 2007 to December 2012.
PC DCDS % DBond spread % Equity Ret. DBasis % DAdj. Basis %
Panel A
1 64% 50% 70% 45% 34%
2 12% 14% 7% 13% 16%
3 7% 11% 6% 10% 12%
Tot 3 84% 75% 82% 67% 61%
Country PC 1 PC 2 PC 1 PC 2 PC 1 PC 2 PC 1 PC 2 PC 1 PC 2
Loadings (Eigenvectors) Panel B
AT 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.10 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.31
BE 0.36 0.07 0.40 0.18 0.32 0.08 0.34 0.11 0.43 0.07
DE 0.33 0.28 // // 0.34 0.02 0.35 0.29 // //
FR 0.36 0.20 0.39 0.32 0.36 0.02 0.37 0.24 0.37 0.34
GR 0.28 0.38 0.02 0.32 0.23 0.79 0.16 0.33 0.23 0.08
IE 0.27 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.06 0.20 0.56 0.24 0.43
IT 0.36 0.06 0.39 0.13 0.35 0.05 0.34 0.11 0.36 0.25
NL 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.45
PT 0.24 0.56 0.24 0.57 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.45 0.25 0.55
SP 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.29 0.43 0.34 0.14 0.39 0.15
Average Loadings
Core 0.34 0.24 0.37 0.28 0.33 0.08 0.36 0.20 0.36 0.29
Periph. 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.33 0.29 0.11 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.29
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PCs explain 82% of the variation. The 1st PC places similar weights
(approximately 0.30), across all countries and can be interpreted
again as a ‘‘level factor”. In contrast, the 2nd PC lacks a clear eco-
nomic interpretation. These results suggest that elements of differ-
entiation across euro area countries are better captured by the
dynamics of sovereign debt markets rather that the equity market.4.2. The CDS-bond basis
We define the CDS-bond basis as the difference between a
country’s CDS premium and the corresponding government bond
yield spread for the same maturity. Furthermore, we define the
‘‘adjusted” basis as the difference between the CDS-bond basis of
a country relative to that of Germany, taken as the benchmark
Fig. 2. CDS-bond Basis – Euro Area Sovereigns. This figure shows the time-series
dynamics of the CDS-bond basis for nine euro area countries. The CDS premia, the
national benchmark bonds and the risk-free benchmark (i.e. the German bund),
used to calculate the bond spread have a 10-year maturity. The sample period is
January 2007 to December 2012. Observations are expressed in basis points and are
at a weekly frequency.
Fig. 3. CDS-bond Basis – ‘‘Core” vs ‘‘Periphery” Countries. This figure shows the
time-series dynamics of the within group average of the CDS-bond basis for ‘‘core”
(AT, BE, DE, FR and NL) and ‘‘peripheral” (GR, IE, IT, PT and SP) countries. The CDS
premia, the national benchmark bonds and the risk-free benchmark (i.e. the
German bund) used to calculate the basis have a 10-year maturity. The sample
period is January 2007 to December 2012. Observations are expressed in basis
points and are at a weekly frequency.
Fig. 4. CDS-bond Basis vs. ‘‘Adjusted” CDS-bond Basis – Italy. This figure shows the
basis and ‘‘adjusted” CDS-bond basis for one selected country: Italy. The ‘‘adjusted”
basis is defined the difference between the respective country’s risk premium over
Germany, as priced in the CDS market and in the government bond market. The CDS
premium, the national benchmark bond and the risk-free benchmark (i.e. the
German bund) used to calculate the bond spread have a 10-year maturity. The
sample period is January 2007 to December 2012. Observations are expressed in
basis points and are at a weekly frequency.
15 The basis for Portugal, Greece and Ireland temporarily declined below zero in
several periods (i.e. April–May 2009 and May–June 2010) and became persistently
negative from 2011 onwards. In contrast, the basis for Italy and Spain started
declining from the beginning of 2011, fell below zero in summer 2011 and became
persistently negative from the summer of 2012 on.
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between the respective country’s risk premium over Germany
(which has the most liquid and well-functioning government bond
market in the euro area), as priced in the CDS market and in the
government bond market. A negative ‘‘adjusted” CDS-bond basis
implies that a country’s bond spread over the German bund is lar-
ger than its CDS differential vis-à-vis Germany.
Fig. 2 plots the time series of the basis and shows that since the
onset of the US subprime crisis and even more so during the euro
area sovereign debt crisis it deviated from zero persistently and
exhibited strong co-movements across countries.
To quantify the co-movement in the basis we again conduct a
principal component analysis. In Table 2, Panel A, the third and
fourth columns list the percentage of explained variation by the
first three components of the basis and the ‘‘adjusted” basis. For
the CDS-bond bases (and ‘‘adjusted” bases) the 1st PC alone
explains 45% (34%), the 2nd PC the 13% (16%), whereas the first
three PCs explain 67% (61%) of the total variation. As shown in
Panel B, the 1st PC places similar weights, across all countriesand the average loading for the CDS-bond basis (‘‘adjusted bases”)
within the two different groups of ‘‘core” and ‘‘peripheral” coun-
tries is of 0.36 vs. 0.26 (0.36 vs. 0.30). This can therefore be defined
as a ‘‘level factor”. The 2nd PC, instead, differentiates well between
countries, as the average loading within the two different groups of
‘‘core” and ‘‘peripheral” countries is of -0.20 vs. 0.32 (-0.29 vs. 0.29
for the ‘‘adjusted” basis). This 2nd PC can, therefore, be interpreted
as a ‘‘core vs. periphery” factor. Notably, for the basis (and ‘‘ad-
justed” basis), the first two PCs appear to have the same economic
interpretation than in the case of CDSs and bond spreads suggest-
ing that its dynamics is strongly linked to conditions in sovereign
debt markets. Based on the PCA results we plot, in Fig. 3, the time
series of the (within group) average basis for ‘‘core” vs ‘‘peripheral”
countries.
The bases for the two groups of countries were characterized
by a strong degree of co-movement, but were at similar levels only
up to May 2010; then they diverged substantially. While the
basis for ‘‘core” countries was persistently positive, the basis for
‘‘peripheral” countries fell below zero on several occasions from
2011 on.15 Fig. 4 compares the basis and the ‘‘adjusted” basis for
Italy. Even if the two series differ in their levels they co-move
strongly; the correlation coefficient calculated on weekly changes
is 0.93.
Table 1, Panel B, reports the descriptive statistics of the basis
and the ‘‘adjusted” basis weekly changes for all countries. The
behaviour of the two measures is similar, but ‘‘core” and ‘‘periph-
eral” countries have a different characterization: the average
change, expressed in basis points, of the basis is positive for ‘‘core”
countries (0.17) and negative for ‘‘peripheral” countries (-0.10).
The average change of the ‘‘adjusted” basis is approximately zero
for ‘‘core” countries (0.05) and negative for ‘‘peripheral” countries
(0.26). Also, the volatility is larger for ‘‘peripheral” countries
(22.39 vs. 7.40) and the correlation between basis and ‘‘adjusted”
basis weekly changes is larger for ‘‘peripheral” countries (0.95 vs.
0.73).
Table 3
Covariates – variable definitions. This table shows variable definitions of the covariates used in the empirical analysis and their data sources. Panel A. contains the proxies for
credit risk, Panel B. the proxies for the risk premium, Panel C. the proxies for bond trading activity and ‘‘arbitrage frictions” in the credit markets.
Proxies for credit risk Source
Panel A
Rf Risk-free rate (Euribor 3 m) Bloomberg
Slope 10 Year Euro Swap rate minus 3 Month Euribor Bloomberg
Eq Ret A country’s equity index returns minus euro area equity Index Datastream
Eq Vol Annualized GARCH (1,1) volatility of idiosyncratic equity returns Datastream
Debt/Leverage (Gov Bond outstanding amounts) / GDP Bloomberg
Proxies for global risk factors
Panel B
Risk Premium VSTOXX (index of implied volatility of the EuroStoxx50) – annualized GARCH (1.1) realized volatility Bloomberg
EVZ Exchange rate Euro/USD Implied Volatility Bloomberg
Bond trading activity and ‘‘frictions”
Panel C
Bond Volume Weekly bond volume (Billion Euro) and transaction N. (average all maturities) MTS
Bond Bid-Ask Weekly bid-ask spread (average all maturities) MTS
Bond Outst. Government bond outstanding amounts/ GDP Bloomberg
SMP Purchases Weekly ECB euro area government bond purchases ECB
Bond Haircut Italian bond haircut (7–10 year maturity) CCG
Quantity on Loan Quantity of bonds on loan/borrowed and is a proxy for ‘‘short-selling activity” Data Explorers
Active Utilisation % of securities in lending programmes which are currently out on loan and gives
an indication of the lack of bonds to short in the market.
Data Explorers
Available Quantity Proxy for ‘‘institutional ownership”. Data Explorers
Indicative Fee Borrowing cost of the bond to short-sell (expressed in steps from 1 to 5) Data Explorers
Bond Specialness Repo on the bond – General Collateral Repo rate (available for Italy and Spain) ECB
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4.3.1. The determinants of CDS premia and bond spreads
The theoretical framework of the Merton model (1974), which
is a cornerstone in the literature on credit risk, is oriented towards
corporate credit risk. Gapen et al. (2008) extend this structural
modelling approach towards sovereign credit risk, thereby provid-
ing a contingent-claim based valuation of default risky government
bonds, where the key drivers of the risk of sovereign default are the
volatility of sovereign assets and a country’s leverage.
Based on this framework, we use a broad set of potential covari-
ates (cf. Table 3 Panel A and B for definitions and data sources16).Risk-free rate. In the Merton (1974) model the level of the risk-free
rate is negatively related to credit spreads. A higher risk-free rate
implies a higher expected growth rate of the firm value. In turn,
this implies a lower price of the put option on the firm value and
a lower the credit spread. As a euro-wide proxy for the risk-free
rate we use the three-month Euribor rate.Slope of the term structure. In the Longstaff and Schwarz (1995)
structural credit risk model the interest rate is stochastic. In the
long run, the short rate is expected to converge to the long rate.
Hence, an increasing slope of the term structure should lead to
an increase in the expected future spot rate. This in turn, will
decrease credit spreads through its effect on the drift of the asset
value process. We proxy for the slope of the term structure taking
the difference between the ten-year Euro Swap-rate and the three-
month Euribor rate.17Idiosyncratic equity returns. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) use stock
returns as a proxy for the overall state of a country’s economy. For
the purpose of a clearer identification, we use a country’s idiosyn-
cratic stock returns rather than its total returns, which we define as
the difference between the national equity-index return and the
market-wide index return as represented by the Datastream euro16 Summary statistics of all the explanatory variables are available upon request.area equity index. Our hypothesis is that the country-specific
equity return is negatively related to a country’s credit spreads.
Idiosyncratic equity volatility. Campbell and Taksler (2003) docu-
ment that variation in US corporate spreads is more strongly linked
to idiosyncratic stock price volatility than to aggregate stock price
volatility. Based on this result, we use the idiosyncratic volatility
which we calculate as the annualised GARCH (1, 1) volatility of
idiosyncratic stock returns (defined as a country’s stock returns
minus Datastream euro are equity index). We expect idiosyncratic
equity volatility and credit spreads to be positively related.
Country leverage. This variable is the ratio between a country’s
public debt, i.e. outstanding bonds, and its GDP. The idea is that
credit quality of sovereign debt increases with a country’s fiscal
discipline as captured by a lower debt-to-GDP ratio (see also
Gapen et al. 2008). This ratio is also acknowledged in a fiscal policy
perspective as the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact aims to cap a
country’s total debt at 60 % of its GDP.17
Credit spreads not only compensate investors for pure expected
losses. Spreads vary due to changes in investors’ risk aversion even
if the underlying fundamentals (i.e. the pricing under the ‘‘statisti-
cal measure”) are unchanged. For example, Longstaff et al. (2011)
show that also global risk factors drive sovereign credit spreads.
Table 3 Panel B. contains variables, which proxy for ‘‘global risk
factors”.
Risk premium. We focus on the VSTOXX, the index of implied
volatility (European VIX) based on the EuroStoxx50. In order to
obtain a proxy for the risk premium, we deduct a GARCH-based
estimate of volatility from the VSTOXX index. This variable repre-
sents the risk premium which investors in equity options require
in order to compensate them for equity market risk in Europe.
We expect the ‘‘risk-premium” and credit spreads to be positively
related.As we focus only on long-term bonds this variable is lower than the usual debt-
to-GDP ratio. The amount of bonds outstanding is available in Bloomberg with a
monthly frequency. We use linear interpolation to obtain weekly observations.
Fig. 5. Total and Weekly Securities Market Programme (SMP) Purchases Amounts. On the left-hand side axis this figure shows the book value of the cumulative SMP
purchases, while on the right weekly purchases. Amounts are in billion Euro as of Friday of each given week.
A. Fontana, M. Scheicher / Journal of Banking & Finance 62 (2016) 126–140 133Euro/USD exchange rate uncertainty. Higher uncertainty about the
future path of the exchange rate should make protection quoted
in USD more expensive than in Euro.18 As a proxy for the exchange
rate uncertainty, we use the 30-day implied exchange rate volatility
index (EVZ), provided by CBOE, which follows the methodology of
the VIX index. We expect this variable to correlate positively with
CDS premia.4.3.2. Measures of bond trading activity and ‘‘frictions”
Table 3 Panel C. shows the variables we use to capture the
amount of bond trading activity in the secondary market and the
‘‘short-selling” and ‘‘funding frictions” in the repo market.Government bond volume and bid-ask spread. We use transaction
data from the MTS Group. We consider government bonds with
all maturities. We use daily trading volumes, which we sum to
obtain weekly data. Bid-ask spreads are weekly averages of the
daily observations.Available quantity. This variable, taken from Data Explorers (Mar-
kit), is the amount of securities in lending programs and is a proxy
for ‘‘institutional ownership”. The inventories which owners make
available to a bond’s borrowers will tend to increase or decrease in
line with their purchases and sales across their portfolios.Quantity on loan. This variable, also taken from Data Explorers (Mar-
kit), quantifies bonds on loan/borrowed, i.e. a measure for the
amount of ‘‘short-selling activity” taking place. This information is
specific to the benchmark bond of each country in the sample.Active utilisation. This variable is defined as the share (%) of securi-
ties in lending programs which are currently out on loan. When
Active Utilisation is high there is a lack of bonds available to short
in the market, hence it measures ‘‘short-selling frictions”. This infor-
mation is available at the bond-level for all our benchmark bonds.19 Interventions focused on bond from 2 to 10 year maturity. The ECB initially did
not disclose the target and the amount of these operations, but has provided, on
February 21, 2013, securities holdings at the country level. Out of 218 billion euros of
total purchases, 103 refer to Italian bonds, 44 to Spanish bonds, 34 to Greek bonds, 32Indicative fee. This variable, taken from Data Explorers (Markit), is
an indicative fee, expressed in steps from 1 to 5, of the borrowing
cost of the bond to short-sell. Hence, it is a price measure of the
cost of ‘‘short-selling” and is expected to correlate positively with
Active Utilisation.18 The euro is expected to devaluate in case of a euro area country default, hence
protection in USD is more costly because it provides a currency hedge.SMP purchases. These data (shown in Fig. 5) refer to the book value,
expressed in billion euros, of the total cumulative purchases, as of
Friday of each given week. The ECB activated this program on May
10, 2010 to intervene for buying Greek, Portuguese and Irish gov-
ernment bonds and re-activated it on August, 7 2011 for buying
Italian and Spanish bonds (Corradin and Maddaloni, 2015).19
Bond specialness. This variable is available to us only for Italian
bonds. In a repo agreement a security is sold together with the
commitment to buy it back at a given later date. The party buying
the security is providing collateralized financing to the other party
which has entered a reverse repo. This type of operation is typically
conduced to short-sell a security.20 The bond ‘‘specialness”, which is
defined as the difference between the general repo rate and the rate
on a specific bond any given day is a measure of the cost of ‘‘short-
selling” the bond. When the rate to obtain a specific security is very
low ‘‘short-selling” becomes costly. In our analysis, this cost directly
affects the risk/return profile of a ‘‘positive basis trade”. Bond spe-
cialness is a short-selling friction measure based on prices, i.e. which
captures the cost of short-selling a bond in a repo. Active Utilisation
is a short-selling friction measure based on quantities as it captures
the availability of bonds to short-sell.
Haircuts on government bonds. This variable is available to us only
for Italy, Spain and France. Data on haircuts are obtained from
LCH-CLEARNET. Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) show that during
the crisis, funding problems have had significant asset pricing
effects. As an example they mention the violation of the law of
one price in the case of CDS and bond yield spreads: ‘‘securities
with nearly identical cash flows, but different margins, traded at
a different price, giving rise to price gaps (basis)”. Therefore, we
expect negative basis deviations, during periods of high market
stress, to be related to increasing haircuts in the repo market.
Government bonds outstanding. We standardize a country’s total
outstanding bonds by calculating the relative ratio over its GDP.
These two variables are taken from Bloomberg. As discussed in
Subsection 4.3.1 this is a proxy for a country’s debt levelto Portuguese bonds and 14 to Irish bonds.
20 As documented by Corradin and Maddaloni (2015), tensions in the unsecured
inter-banking market, due to increase of counterparty risk, have shifted a substantial
amount of the financial intermediaries’ financing activity to the secured repo market.
Table 4
Credit Spreads and the Basis – Cross-Sectional Analysis. This table reports results from
a panel regression with time-fixed effects on credit spreads and the basis. The
regression specification is given by Yit = a + b1 EqRetit + b2EqVolit + b3Debtit + vt + eit
Reported coefficients are in basis points and p-values are (in parentheses) are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by
⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄ respectively. Panel A. reports results in levels, Panel B. in changes. The
sample period is November 2008–December 2012. Observations are at a weekly
frequency.
Variable CDS Bond spread Basis Adj Basis
Panel A
C 54.396⁄⁄⁄ 38.749 48.847⁄⁄⁄ 31.66⁄⁄⁄
(0.002) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000)
EqRet 0.142 0.017 0.031 0.028
(0.275) (0.920) (0.406) (0.456)
EqVol 0.243⁄⁄⁄ 0.093⁄⁄⁄ 0.037⁄⁄⁄ 0.033⁄⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt 1.549⁄⁄⁄ 1.301⁄⁄⁄ 0.277⁄⁄⁄ 0.156⁄⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. 2160 1941 1941 1941
Adj. R-sq 0.453 0.121 0.125 0.214
Variable D (CDS) D (Bond Spread) D (Basis) D (Adj Basis)
Panel B
C 1.292⁄⁄⁄ 1.247 0.216⁄⁄ 0.350⁄⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.847) (0.020) (0.000)
DEqRet 0.039⁄⁄⁄ 0.013 0.005 0.006
(0.004) (0.727) (0.520) (0.474)
DEqVol 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.010
(0.268) (0.911) (0.132) (0.157)
DDebt 1.085 0.006 0.118 0.133
(0.395) (0.896) (0.899) (0.873)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. 2160 1941 1941 1941
Adj. R-sq 0.347 0.128 0.256 0.194
Table 5
Time-Series Analysis of Credit Spreads. This table reports results from a panel
regression with country-fixed effects on credit spreads and the basis. The regression
specification is given by DYit = a + XTit b1 + b2DRft + b3DSlopet + b4DRPt + b5DEVZt + -
b3DSlopet+ b4DRPt+ b5DEVZt+qi+ eit. The vectorDXit represents the
base case covariates of countr-specific variables. Reported coefficients
are in basis points and p-values are in parentheses are adjusted for
heteroskedasticit. Significance levels at 1, and 1 are denoted b ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄
respectivel. Results are in changes. The sample period is November to
December 1. Observations are at a weekl frequenc.
Variable D(CDS) D(Bond spread) D(Basis) D(Adj basis)
C 1.357 0.371 0.121 0.181
(0.289) (0.794) (0.890) (0.819)
D(Rf) 0.214 0.259 0.013 0.113
(0.355) (0.209) (0.927) (0.319)
D(Slope) 0.157⁄ 0.076 0.042 0.008
(0.079) (0.404) (0.455) (0.869)
D(EqRet) 0.046⁄⁄⁄ 0.006 0.011 0.008
(0.001) (0.870) (0.234) (0.362)
D(EqVol) 0.018⁄ 0.004 0.011 0.015⁄⁄
(0.088) (0.839) (0.125) (0.030)
D(Debt) 0.920 0.757 0.277 0.265
(0.520) (0.397) (0.771) (0.764)
D(RP) 0.015⁄⁄⁄ 0.013⁄⁄⁄ 0.003 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.215) (0.659)
D(EVZ) 0.026⁄⁄⁄ 0.028⁄⁄⁄ 0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.000) (0.979) (0.979)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. 2160 1941 1941 1941
Adj R-sq 0.129 0.041 0.028 0.026
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other interpretations. For bonds, in a market with elastic demand
this variable also reflects bond market liquidity because a larger
bond market generally contributes to lower transaction costs.
However, if new issuance exceeds existing demand, then an
adverse impact on bond market liquidity could materialise. For
these reasons, we expect this variable to capture also illiquidity
conditions in the bond market, not only the level of credit risk.5. Empirical analysis
5.1. The determinants of credit spreads
In this section we investigate whether our selected key drivers
of credit risk affects the variation of CDS premia and bond spreads
differently during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, as discussed
in Hypothesis 1. Data are weekly observations.21 We start with a
cross-sectional analysis. For this purpose, we estimate a panel
regression with time-fixed effects of credit spreads on a set of coun-
try specific variables:
Yit ¼ aþ b1EqRetit þ b2EqVolit þ b3Debtit þ v t þ eit ð1Þ
with Yit being a vector of dimension ten representing the CDS pre-
mium or the bond spread of a country i at time t. Time fixed effects
(FE) are captured by vt. Table 4 Panel A reports results from regres-
sions in levels, while Panel B from regressions in changes. We find
that most coefficients are significant and their signs correspond to
our hypothesis. In the case of regressions in levels, equity volatility
and leverage are positively related to credit spreads. For regressions21 In the reported analysis observations are weekly. These results are confirmed also
for daily and bi-weekly data.in changes the significance of the results is weaker. Equity returns
negatively affect credit spreads, but are significant only for CDS pre-
mia. Overall, considering the significance of the coefficients and the
explanatory power of the regressions, CDS premia are more sensi-
tive to ‘‘country specific” determinants than bond yield spreads.
As a second step we implement a time-series analysis. Our aim
is to test whether other variables, beyond country-specific vari-
ables, also have explanatory power. These new factors cannot be
added in Eq. (1) because of the lack of cross-sectional variation.
For this purpose, we estimate the following panel regression model
with country-fixed effects:
DYit ¼ aþ XTitb1 þ b2DRft þ b3DSlopet þ b4DRPt þ b5DEVZt
þ qi þ eit ð2Þ
with Yit being a vector of dimension ten representing the CDS pre-
mia or the bond spread of a country i at time t. Xit is the vector of
country specific covariates from model (1). Country fixed effects
(FE) are captured by qi. Table 5 reports results. The hypothesis of
a unit-root is not rejected by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
for credit spreads and for the explanatory variables expressed in
levels, therefore we estimate this equation in changes only.22 In
the case of CDS premia, we find that for most of the covariates, such
as the ‘‘country specific variables”, the risk-free rate (Slope) and the
‘‘proxies for risk premium” the signs of the coefficients, which are sig-
nificant, correspond to our hypothesis. In contrast, in the case of
bond spreads, only proxies for ‘‘risk premium” are significant and
with the expected sign. This analysis further confirms that CDS pre-
mia are more sensitive to ‘‘country specific” drivers than bond
spreads.
We also investigate the role of variables which according to pre-
vious research influence credit spreads in determining the basis.
For this purpose, we proceed by again estimating respectively
model (1) and (2) as for CDS premia and bond spreads. Results of
the cross-sectional analysis reported in Table 4 Panel A show that22 Results are omitted for reasons of space.
Table 6
The basis and ‘‘short-selling frictions” – panel regressions. This table reports results
from a panel regression of the basis and ‘‘adjusted” basis on short-selling frictions.
Panel A. reports results of regressions in levels with time fixed effect. Panel B. reports
results in changes. P-values are (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄ respectively. The
sample period is November 2008 to December 2012. Observations are at a weekly
frequency.
Variable Basis Adj Basis
Panel A. cross-section
C Yes Yes
Active Utilisation 0.378⁄⁄⁄ 0.379⁄⁄⁄
(0.004) (0.004)
Country Specific Covariates as controls Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
N. 1941 1941
Adj. R-sq 0.125 0.233
D(Basis) D(Adj basis)
Panel B. time-series
C Yes Yes
D(Active utilisation) 0.141⁄ 0.133⁄⁄
(0.076) (0.013)
D(Country specific covariates) Yes Yes
D(Global proxies risk premium) Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
N. 1941 1941
Adj. R-sq 0.022 0.023
ADF 2.020 2.000
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volatility and leverage. As reported in Table 4 Panel B. and Table 5,
basis changes in the cross-section and the basis time-series
dynamics are not explained by the covariates considered in the
regressions. Groba et al. (2013) use a similar set of explanatory
variables to proxy for country-specific and global factors in euro
area CDS premia and obtain similar findings.23
The CDS premium and the bond spread, within each country, do
not correlate perfectly (average correlation is 0.60) as would be
expected in the case of a no-arbitrage relation. In our view, this
observation and the results discussed in this section altogether
support hypothesis (H.1) that the key drivers of sovereign credit
risk have affected CDS premia and bond spreads in a different
way during the crisis.
5.2. Short-selling frictions
The CDS-bond basis is not explained by the country specific and
global variables which explain credit spreads; at the same time it
exhibits a strong degree of co-movement across countries, as
highlighted by the PCA in Section 4, meaning that it is driven to
a large extent by common determinants.
When the basis is positive (CDS premium exceeds bond spread),
arbitrageurs can in principle profit from this deviation. A ‘‘positive
basis trade” involves short-selling the bond and selling protection
(i.e. the CDS) on the underlying bond. Here, we test the hypothesis
(H.2) that ‘‘short-selling frictions”, preventing arbitrageurs
to short-sell a bond and profit from a ‘‘positive basis trade”
explain persistently positive basis deviations. First, we explore
the role of ‘‘frictions” in the cross-section. For this purpose, we
estimate the panel regression model (1), with time-fixed effects,
where we include active utilisation, our proxy for ‘‘short-selling
frictions”:
Basisit ¼ a0 þ XTitb1 þ c1ActiveUtilisationit þ v t þ eit ð3Þ
Xit is the vector of country specific control variables from model
(1). Time fixed effects (FE) are captured by vt. As shown in Table 6,
the basis and the ‘‘adjusted” basis are both positively related to
short selling frictions (coefficients 0,378 and 0,379).
Second, to study time-series implications we estimate the
following panel regression with country-fixed effects:
DBasisit ¼ a0 þ DXTitb1 þ DZtb2 þ c1DActiveUtilisationðitkÞ þ qi
þ eit ð4Þ
Zit is the vector of the global proxies for the risk premium from
model (2). Country fixed effects (FE) are captured by qi. Table 6
shows that the basis and the adjusted” basis increase when active
utilisation increases (coefficients are 0.141 and 0.133). The coeffi-
cient is significant only with a lag of two. Hence, pricing deviations
take place with some delay with respect to the appearance of
frictions. To further investigate the time-series link between
‘‘short-selling frictions” and the basis, we apply the Engle–Granger
two-step approach (Engle and Granger (1987)). First, we estimate
a specification of the model with the variables in levels. Our
assumption is that the long run relationship between the basis
and active utilisation, on a country by country level is:
Basist ¼ a0 þ a1ActiveUtilisationt þ ut ð5Þ23 In particular Groba et al. (2013) find that exchange rate fluctuations and a factor
representing distressed economies explain the variation of CDS premia. They also find
that the explanatory ability of local and global factors is not as high as reported in
Longstaff et al. (2011).If we reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals there is
a long run relationship between the variables, i.e. they are cointe-
grated. When residuals are unit-root stationary,24 we estimate the
short-run regressions, using first differences of the variables and the
lagged error, obtained in the long run Eq. (5), by means of the follow-
ing Error Correction Model:
DBasist ¼ b0 þ ku^ðt1Þ þ b1DActiveUtilisationðtkÞ þ et ð6Þ
As shown in Table 7 Panel A the basis and active utilisation co-
move positively in levels. This is the case for almost all the coun-
tries across the euro area, as the coefficient is positive and we
reject the hypothesis of a unit-root of the residuals.
As shown in Panel B the lagged error (estimated in the first step)
explains future changes of the basis, implying that the basis tends
to revert back to its equilibrium whenever it deviates from it. As
expected, active utilisation tends to anticipate basis movements.
We conclude that there is strong support in favour of hypothesis 2.
5.3. The basis and the ‘‘flight-to-quality/liquidity” phenomenon
In periods of market distress investors tend to rebalance their
portfolios towards less risky and more liquid securities. This phe-
nomenon is usually referred to as a ‘‘flight-to-quality” or a ‘‘fligh
t-to-liquidity”. It is usually difficult to disentangle the two effects.
In the context of the euro are sovereign crisis, if investors increase
their German Bund holdings but reduce their holdings of other
countries’ debt it is unclear whether they do so because of their
concerns about credit risk or market liquidity risk as these two
risks are strongly correlated. Evidence of the ‘‘flight to quality/
liquidity” phenomena is provided by the fact that CDS premia
and bond spreads (i.e. respectively 0.42, 0.41) correlate nega-
tively with the German bund.
In this section we test the hypothesis (H. 3) that more credit-
worthy countries with more liquid government bonds have larger
CDS-bond bases. As the ‘‘flight-to-quality” effect has shifted bond24 We check for unit-root stationarity of the residuals by mean of the Augmented
Dickey Fuller Test. In this case the OLS estimator is super consistent and there are no
spurious regression problems when we estimate the vector of parameters in (5).
Table 7
The basis and ‘‘short-selling frictions” – cointegration analysis. This table presents the results of the Engle-Granger two-step estimation. (Panel A) First, we estimate the model
using the variables in levels. The long run relationship between the basis and Active Utilisation is: Basist = a0 + a1 ActiveUtilisationt + ut. We check for unit-root stationarity of the
residuals by mean of the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test. (Panel B) Second, we estimate the short-run regressions, using first differences of the variables and the lagged error,
obtained in the long run equation, by mean of the following Error Correction Model: DBasist = b0 + kû(t1) + b1DActiveUtilisation(tk) + et. Reported coefficients are in basis points
and p-values are (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄ respectively. The sample period is November
2008 to December 2012. Observations are at a weekly frequency.
AT BE DE FR NL IE IT PT SP
Long-Run Regressions
Basis
Panel A
C 31.762⁄⁄⁄ 36.496⁄⁄⁄ 37.988⁄⁄⁄ 14.483 8.731 -13.298 8.690⁄ -24.162⁄⁄ 16.43⁄⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.111) (0.137) (0.087) (0.040) (0.143)
Active Utilis. 0.668⁄⁄⁄ 0.177 0.725⁄⁄⁄ 0.988⁄⁄⁄ 1.039⁄⁄⁄ 0.173 0.707⁄⁄⁄ 1.012⁄⁄⁄ 0.167⁄⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.415) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.535) (0.000) (0.013) (0.522)
Adj. R-sq 0.167 0.003 0.143 0.283 0.355 0.001 0.279 0.097 0.004
Prob. Resid ADF 0.002 0.084 0.095 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.217
Short-Run Regressions
D(Basis)
Panel B
Long-Run Resid 0.093⁄⁄ 0.054⁄⁄ 0.028⁄ 0.037⁄⁄ 0.042⁄⁄ 0.120⁄⁄⁄ 0.018⁄ 0.132⁄⁄⁄ 0.054⁄
Lag 1 (0.012) (0.015) (0.072) (0.036) (0.032) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.052)
D(Active Utilis.) 0.151⁄⁄ 0.046 0.047 0.109⁄⁄ 0.143⁄⁄ 0.163 0.545⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄ 0.120⁄⁄
(0.045) (0.552) (0.223) (0.067) (0.027) (0.191) (0.002) (0.995) (0.242)
D(Active Utilis.) 0.076 0.038 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.113 0.327⁄⁄ 0.057 0.114
Lag 1 (0.370) (0.766) (0.805) (0.893) (0.370) (0.422) (0.028) (0.761) (0.220)
D(Active Utilis.) 0.074 0.048 0.041 0.007 0.015 0.051 0.097 0.430 0.028
Lag2 (0.343) (0.647) (0.288) (0.904) (0.343) (0.584) (0.494) (0.169) (0.773)
Adj. R-sq 0.051 0.014 0.021 0.011 0.021 0.050 0.138 0.068 0.019
ADF 2.051 1.924 2.121 2.004 2.106 1.906 2.091 2.002 2.051
Table 8
The basis and the ‘‘flight-to-quality/liquidity”– cross-sectional analysis. Panel A. reports results from a panel regression, with time-fixed effects, of the basis on various liquidity
and credit risk measures: Basisit = a + b Xit + vt + eit (7), Xit is the vector of the proxies for liquidity and credit risk. Panel B. shows the result of a panel regression, with time-fixed
effects, of various liquidity measures such as bid-ask spreads and bond volumes on credit risk as proxied by the level of the CDS Premium: Bond Liquidityit = a + b CDSit + vt + eit (8).
Panel C. shows the result of a panel regression, with time-fixed effects, of Active Utilisation on liquidity measures such as bid-ask spreads and bond volumes and on credit risk as
proxied by the level of the CDS Premium: Active Utilisationit = a + b Xit + vt + eit (9). Time fixed effects (FE) are captured by vt. Reported coefficients are in basis points and p-values
are (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄ respectively. The sample period is November 2008 to
December 2012. Observations are weekly.
CDS-bond basis
Panel A
C 49.912⁄⁄⁄ 23.434⁄⁄⁄ 144.006⁄⁄⁄ 9.210⁄⁄⁄ 6.384⁄⁄
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024)
CDS Premia 0.156⁄⁄⁄
(0.000)
Bid-Ask Spread 1.277⁄⁄
(0.012)
Log(bond volume) 8.357⁄⁄⁄
(0.000)
Log(Bond N.Trd) 7,456⁄⁄⁄
(0.000)
Active Utilisation 0.531⁄⁄⁄
(0.000)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bid-ask Log(Bond Vol.) Active utilisation
Panel B Panel C
C 0.922⁄⁄⁄ 21.845⁄⁄⁄ 35.034⁄⁄⁄ 29.251⁄⁄⁄ 4.825⁄⁄⁄
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,432)
CDS Premia 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.579⁄⁄⁄ 0.031⁄⁄⁄
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Bid-ask 0.634⁄⁄⁄
(0,000)
Log(Bond Volume) 1.711⁄⁄⁄
(0,000)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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liquidity to be reflected in a price premium (or yield discount),
hence in a relatively lower bond yield spread and a higherCDS-bond basis. Also, we expect bond illiquidity to be reflected
in a yield premium, hence in a relatively higher bond yield spread
and a lower CDS-bond basis. As discussed in Section 5.1, the basis
Table 9
The basis, CDS and Bond spreads and the SMP. Panel A. reports results regression for the basis, Panel B. for the CDS premia and Panel C. for the bond spreads. P-values are (in
parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ⁄⁄⁄, ⁄⁄ and ⁄ respectively. The sample period is November 2008 to December
2012. Observations are at a weekly frequency.
AT BE DE FR GR NL IE IT PT SP
D(Basis)
Panel A
C 0,086 0.213 0.877⁄⁄ 0.534 0.296 0.236 0.125 0.479 1.288 0.311
(0.907) (0.793) (0.062) (0.462) (0.936) (0.672) (0.956) (0.717) (0.692) (0.686)
SMP 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.002⁄⁄ 0.002 0.006 0.001
(0.924) (0.664) (0.400) (0.714) (0.138) (0.747) (0.016) (0.006) (0.000) (0.276)
SMP May 2010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.011⁄⁄⁄ 0.000 0.004⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 0.006⁄⁄⁄ 0.001
(0.987) (0.348) (0.875) (0.603) (0.002) (0.748) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.570)
SMP August 2011 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 // 0.001 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄⁄ 0.006⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄
(0.473) (0.235) (0.355) (0.429) // (0.463) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.070)
Adj. R-sq 0.027 0.011 0.045 0.006 0.191 0.002 0.012 0.109 0.756 0.034
D-W 1.931 1.951 1.952 1.989 2.216 1.970 2.031 1.916 2.000 2.038
D(CDS)
Panel B
C 0.306 0.974 0.419 0.592 9.264 0.384 1.869 1.530 2.525 1.860
(0.831) (0.499) (0.771) (0.680) (0.008) (0.789) (0.194) (0.288) (0.079) (0.196)
SMP 0.001 0.002⁄⁄ 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄
(0.426) (0.022) (0.596) (0.446) (0.387) (0.514) (0.002) (0.027) (0.018) (0.035)
SMP May 2010 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.364 0.002⁄ 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.651) (0.110) (0.920) (0.610) (0.364) (0.701) (0.100) (0.464) (0.253) (0.307)
SMP August 2011 0.002 0.003⁄⁄ 0.001 0.001 // 0.001 0.003⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄ 0.002
(0.234) (0.036) (0.561) (0.374) // (0.445) (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.196)
Adj. R-sq 0.043 0.043 0.001 0.001 0.102 0.001 0.001 0.025 0.028 0.065
D-W 1.985 1.985 1.999 2.000 1.851 1.999 2.000 2.000 2.002 2.031
D(Bond spreads)
Panel C
C 0.306 0.973 // 0.592 2.000 0.384 1.869 1.530 2.526 1.860
(0.840) (0.523) // (0.697) (0.690) (0.800) (0.220) (0.312) (0.097) (0.222)
SMP 0.001 0.002⁄⁄ // 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄ 0.002⁄
(0.452) (0.030) // (0.4719) 0.968 (0.538) (0.003) (0.037) (0.025) (0.046)
SMP May 2010 0.001 0.002 // 0.001 0.015⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.670) (0.131) // (0.630) (0.000) (0.716) (0.127) (0.489) (0.280) (0.334)
SMP August 201 0.002 0.003⁄⁄ // 0.001 // 0.001 0.003⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄ 0.002
(0.261) (0.048) // (0.401) // (0.471) (0.027) (0.029) (0.019) (0.227)
Adj. R-sq 0.043 0.056 // 0.002 0.038 0.026 0.016 0.003 0.017 0.060
D-W 1.953 1.955 // 1.970 1.913 1.972 1.946 1.957 1.958 1.962
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leverage, in other words, more (less) creditworthy countries tend to
have larger (lower) CDS-bond bases.
Extending model (3) to include liquidity proxies would be prob-
lematic given our small cross-sectional sample, the high number of
variables and their correlation. Therefore, for the purpose of study-
ing the empirical link between the basis, credit risk, liquidity and
‘‘short-selling frictions” we estimate the following univariate panel
regressions on the basis:
Basisit ¼ aþ bXit þ v t þ eit ð7Þ
Xit is either the bid-ask spread, or bond volumes, or number of
transactions, or the CDS Premium or Active Utilisation.25 Time fixed
effects (FE) are captured by vt. Table 8 Panel A. shows that bonds
characterized by lower credit risk, higher liquidity and stronger
‘‘short-selling frictions” tend to have more positive bases.
For studying the relation between credit risk and bond liquidity
we estimate the following univariate panel regression:
BondLiquidityit ¼ aþ bCDSit þ v t þ eit ð8Þ
Where bond liquidity is proxied either by the bid-ask spread,
bond volumes or number of transactions and credit risk by the level
of the CDS premium. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured by vt. Of
particular interest is trying to better understand the relation25 For brevity we report regression results only for the basis. For the ‘‘adjusted” basis
results are similar.between ‘‘short-selling frictions” and credit risk and bond liquidity.
For this purpose, we estimate the following panel univariate
regression:
ActiveUtilisationit ¼ aþ bXit þ v t þ eit ð9Þ
Xit is either the bid-ask spread, bond volumes, number of transac-
tions, or the CDS Premium. Time fixed effects (FE) are captured by vt.
As shown in Table 8 Panel B. bonds with higher credit risk tend to
be characterized by lower liquidity, i.e. by higher bid-ask spreads
and lower trading volume. More creditworthy and more liquid
bonds (as captured by lower CDS premia, lower bid-ask and higher
transaction volumes) tend to be characterized by stronger ‘‘short-
selling frictions”. These results altogether support the view that
‘‘core” countries’ larger positive bases are an implication of the
‘‘flight to quality/liquidity” phenomenon. These positive deviations
tend to persist in time as these more creditworthy and highly liq-
uid bonds tend to trade with a price premium and are, at the same
time, also characterized by stronger ‘‘short-selling frictions”.
5.4. Effects of the ECBs’ bond purchases on the basis
In May 2010, in order to address government bond markets liq-
uidity problems and to contribute to restoring an appropriate mon-
etary policy transmission mechanism, the ECB started to conduct
interventions in dysfunctional euro area bond market segments,
using the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). This programme,
which targeted bonds of peripheral countries, was aimed at
Fig. 6. The Basis and Short-selling Frictions: The case of Italy. On the left-hand side
axis Chart A. shows the dynamics of the basis and on the right-hand side of the
variable ‘‘Active Utilisation”. On the left-hand side axis Chart B. shows the time-
series dynamics of the ‘‘specialness” of the 10 years Italian benchmark bond and on
the right-hand side of DCBS, i.e. the Indicative Fee (expressed in steps from 1 to 5) of
the borrowing cost of the bond to short-sell. The ECB as purchased (among others
also) Italian government bonds through the SMP in August 2011.
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to the absence of trading activity, in situations of high credit risk.
The impact of the SMP cannot be assessed merely from declines
in government bond yields, nor in declining credit spreads, as
neither measure gives an exact picture of market impairments.26
In this Section we test the hypothesis (H 4.) that ECB bonds
purchases have had a positive effect on the basis. The idea is that
upward bond price pressure generated basis deviations which then
were difficult to arbitrage away. To investigate this issue we
regress the basis on the SMP weekly purchases; moreover we
interact the SMP variable with two dummies27. The first dummy
is 1 for the month of May 2010, while the second dummy is 1 for
the month of August 2011 otherwise they are zero; these are
supposed to capture the effect of the purchases in the two months.
Results in Table 9 Panel A. show that SMP purchases have had a
positive effect on the basis for the countries for which the bond26 Government bond yield spreads are affected by a multitude of factors beyond the
ECB’s interventions: by market perceptions about the sustainability of public debt, by
investors’ risk aversion as well as by other European measures such as the actions and
prospects of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). We focus on the impact
of the SMP on the basis; the overall impact of the SMP on bond yields has been
studied e.g. by Eser and Schwaab (2015) who find an impact of approximately 3
basis points at the five-year maturity for purchases of 1/1000 of the outstanding debt.
27 For brevity we report regression results only for the basis. For the ‘‘adjusted” basis
results are qualitatively similar.are purchased and in the specific ‘‘purchasing-periods”. The ECB acti-
vated the program on May 10, 2010 to intervene for buying Greek,
Irish and Portuguese government bonds and re-activated it on
August, 7 2011 for buying Italian and Spanish bonds. The significance
of the coefficients is consistent with the timing of these
interventions.
We run the same regression separately for CDS and bond yield
spreads. Results are reported in Table 9 Panels B and C. For periph-
eral countries, SMP purchases are associated with a decrease of
both CDS and bond spreads, as the coefficients are negative and
generally significant. SMP, interacted with the May2010 and
August2011 dummies, tends to be associated with an increase of
both CDS premia and bond spreads. The SMP programme has been
implemented, to the largest extent, when credit spreads were
increasing sharply and bond markets were extremely illiquid.
The fact that the bond purchases in May 2010 and August 2011
had a positive impact on the basis supports the view that the
buying pressure generated by the SMP had a stabilising effect on
bond yields and was reflected in a temporary improvement of bond
liquidity, e.g. reduction of the bid-ask spreads (see also Eser and
Schwaab (2015)).28
As described by Corradin and Maddaloni (2015) the SMP
portfolio has a long term horizon and bonds are not repoed-out.
Therefore, the ECB intervention has significantly affected ‘‘short-
selling frictions”. For a more detailed analysis we focus on August
2011 when the ECB purchased Italian government bonds. Fig. 6,
Chart A, shows that the basis and ‘‘Active Utilisation” have increased
sharply and instantaneously and have persisted for around three
months after the intervention.
Moreover, Fig. 6, Chart B shows that the ‘‘specialness” of the
10 years Italian benchmark bond (see Corradin and Maddaloni
(2015)) and the Indicative Fee of the borrowing cost of the bond
to short-sell (this is expressed in steps from 1 to 5) have increased
sharply. Fig. 6 shows also that link between the basis and ‘‘short-
selling frictions”, which has been already discussed extensively in
Section 5.3, is quite strong even in periods in which there are no
ECB purchases.5.5. The role of ‘‘funding frictions”
The basis of countries with weaker public finances was negative
in several situations as already documented in the Section 4. Our
hypothesis (H. 5) is that this was due to the appearance of ‘‘funding
frictions” which made it difficult or costly for arbitrageurs to
finance the purchase of the bond (via repo transaction) for imple-
menting ‘‘negative basis” trades. As the time-series of the ‘‘haircut”
on the 10Y benchmark bond is available to us only for Italy and
Spain (also for France, but it is not a ‘‘periphery” country), we can-
not formally test our hypothesis, so we proceed by discussing
anecdotal evidence. Chart A and B of Fig. 7 show that, in the cases
of Italy and Spain, the basis went negative in reaction to sharp
increases of the ‘‘haircut”.
More specifically, for Italy the basis became negative when the
first haircut increase took place, from 3–4% to 6–7%, around mid-
July 2011. It was again negative in the first two months of year
2012 right after the haircut was increased from 7% to 11–12% in
November 2011. Finally, it became persistently negative from
mid-July 2012 on after the haircut was increased from 8% to
11–12%. Throughout this period of stress the basis was not only
negative, it also fluctuated quite substantially.29 The increase of28 Eser and Schwaab (2015) show that bond yield volatility and tail risk are lower on
intervention days for most SMP countries.
29 The positive spikes in August 2011 and in the period from March to July 2012
were shown to be due to the appearance of ‘‘short-selling frictions” as extensively
discussed in Section 5.2.
Fig. 7. Basis, ‘‘Haircuts” and Liquidity of the Italian and Spanish Government bonds. Chart A. shows the time-series dynamics of the 10Y CDS-Bond Basis. Chart B. shows the
time-series dynamics of the Haircuts (expressed in % of the par notional) for the Italian and Spanish Government bonds with a maturity from 7 to 10 years. Chart C. shows the
time-series dynamics of the average bid-ask spread (across all maturities). Chart D. shows the number of daily trades on government bonds (across all maturities). On the
right-hand side axis the figure shows the figure for Italy, while on the left-hand side axis for Spain. Data are weekly observations.
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Italian one both in November 2011 and in August 2012. Consistently,
the basis shifted into negative territory. As shown in Chart 8 C and D
the increase of the ‘‘haircut” in July and November 2011 was associ-
ated with a dramatic deterioration of bond liquidity (as captured by
a sharp increase of the bid-ask spread and by a reduction of trading
activity).30 For example, before July 2011 in the Italian (Spanish)
bond market on average 627 (around 60) daily transactions were
taking place, while afterwards only 436 (around 40).
Haircuts and credit risk are related, in the sense that the haircut
on repos has increased as a result of credit quality deterioration.
The interesting issue is why the deterioration of credit quality
has had different effects on the cash and the derivatives market
(i.e. the basis deviates from zero). What is noteworthy is that credit
quality deterioration has coincided with a dry-up of the liquidity of
the government bond, as captured by an increase of bid-asks and a
reduction of transactions. This is suggestive of the fact that the
illiquidity of the government bond is the driver of the negative
basis (i.e. bond spreads larger than the CDS). Our interpretation
is that the increase in the haircut has triggered large bond sales
(deleveraging) and, most importantly, at the same time made it
more costly for arbitrageurs to finance the purchase of the bond
(via repo transaction) for implementing ‘‘negative basis” trades.
The role of ‘‘funding frictions” in explaining negative basis devia-30 An increase of the haircut was also associated with massive bond sell-offs as
captured by a reduction in institutional ownership (available quantity) from August
2011 on. This chart is not reported for brevity.tions on corporate entities have been extensively studied both the-
oretically and empirically in the context of the US Subprime and
Lehman crisis. As discussed by Duffie (2010) ‘‘slow-moving capital”
has contributed to asset price distortions. Garleanu and Pedersen
(2011) argue that funding problems have had significant asset
pricing effects: ‘‘securities with nearly identical cash flows, but
different margins, traded at a different price, giving rise to price
gaps (basis)”. Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) see capital shortages at
major dealers during the financial crisis as the most plausible
explanation of the negative CDS-Bond basis. Bai and Collin-
Dufresne (2011) point to drivers related to funding risk, counter-
party risk and ‘‘collateral quality”. Fontana (2012) highlights the
role of liquidity risk and ‘‘convergence-trading-activity” in driving
the basis negative during the crisis.6. Conclusion
In principle, CDSs and bonds offer investors a similar exposure
to the risk and return of debt issued by governments; hence, their
pricing should be determined by the same set of risk factors.
Instead, in the euro area sovereign crisis, we observe a complex
relationship between the derivatives market and the underlying
cash market, which is characterised by sizable deviations from
the no-arbitrage relationship.
First, we find that both CDSs and bond spreads correlate posi-
tively with measures of the ‘‘risk premium”, but CDSs exhibit a
stronger correlation with country specific drivers of credit risk.
140 A. Fontana, M. Scheicher / Journal of Banking & Finance 62 (2016) 126–140There is evidence that during times of market stress the number of
market participants who acted as arbitrage traders declined shar-
ply due to decreasing risk appetite and the exit of several major
institutions (see Duffie (2010)). Second, our analysis shows that
the pricing in the CDS and the government bond market has drifted
apart because of ‘‘flight to quality/liquidity” effects in the latter,
but also because of increasing hurdles for those traders who were
trying to exploit what seemed to be sizable arbitrage opportuni-
ties. The increase of sovereign credit risk exacerbated ‘‘short-
selling frictions” in the government bond market and favoured
positive basis deviations and their persistence. Third, the crisis
has adversely affected both ‘‘market” and ‘‘funding liquidity”, with
the consequence that bonds issued by credit risky (i.e. ‘‘periph-
eral”) governments where characterized by negative bases.
Overall, our study highlights the different nature of the pricing
in these two closely linked markets and in particular the role of
frictions impairing arbitrage activities.References
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